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A Contract-Enhancing Norm Limiting Federal Preemp-
tion of Presumptively State Domains 
NimRazook* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Given the extensive federal regulation of areas as diverse as food and 
drug1 and environmental2 regulation, civil rights,3 and, more recently, 
product liability law,4 individuals and businesses predictably and ratio-
nally seek advantageous regulatory reform. Advocates seek national rules 
that provide them strategic advantages and challenge those that pose stra-
tegic problerns.5 They have concluded, apparently, that relying on state-
by-state reforms can be a long and tedious process, and that although 
cumbersome and complex, our national government can provide compre-
hensive regulatory relief that our diverse and often divided states cannot. 
Generally unconstrained by constitutionallimits,6 the debate over the 
propriety of these national regulations has remained principally within 
the extralegal realm of politics, a milieu which generally defies the pre-
scriptions of academics. Several scholars have, nonetheless, proffered 
* Copyright © 1997. Associate Professor of Legal Studies in Business, The University 
of Oklahoma. 
1. See DoNNA J. WOOD, STRATEGIC USES OF PUBLIC POLICY: BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 
IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1986) (analyzing the passage of the Pure Food Act of 1905). 
2. See HARVEY LlliBER, FEDERALISM AND CLEAN WATERS (1975) (documenting the effect 
on federalism of national clean water laws); Samuel P. Hays, Three Decades of Environmental 
Politics: The Historical Context in GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLif!CS: EsSAYS ON 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR Two 27 (Michael J. Lacey ed., 1991) (tracing 
history of forces leading to significant, federal environmental laws). 
3. See, e.g., BURKE MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964) (examining the 
tensions between national civil rights legislation and federalism); THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
(BNA) (1964) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS ACT) (reviewing the scope and spirit of the CRA of 
1964). 
4. See, e.g., Product liability Fairness Act, S. REP. No. 215, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992) 
5. WOOD, supra note 1 (documenting this strategic activity in the passage of the Pure Food 
Act of 1906). 
6. Most would agree that the U.S. Supreme Court has given virtual plenary power to 
Congress to act under the commerce clause. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of 
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993) (stating that for most of the last half century, the 
United States has had no law of federalism); But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, U.S. 
(199 5) (finding abuse of congressional authority under the commerce clause regarding a federal 
law banning pos.session of a gun in local school zone). 
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suggestions, 7 perhaps revealing both a fidelity to the federal system and a 
faith that Congress or even the courts will listen. 
This paper pre..<;cribes contract-based constraints on national 
preemptory regulations which are aimed at historically state-dominated 
areas such as product liability law. Part I examines the norms of federal-
ism including "locus of control" and the presumption favoring state regu-
latory action in those common law areas in which states have enjoyed an 
historic regulatory monopoly. The locus of control norms discussed 
herein govern the appropriate level of regulation between the state and 
national governments. Noting the shortcomings of these norms which 
tend to perpetuate politicization, Part I suggests the need for an additional 
analytic layer. Part II contends that a "contract-enhancing norm" has 
been, since the Progressive Era, the implicit or explicit justification for 
the most significant national incursions into presumptively state domains. 
This is most evident in the application of the contract-enhancing norm in 
the elimination or reduction of information and/or power asymmetries in 
contract and contract-like settings. Part II suggests that such a norm has 
four effects: first, it provides a defensible analytic tool for reducing the 
influence of politics in federal preemption decisions; second, it synthe-
sizes the norm<; of federalism and contract into a simple model for evalu-
ating the appropriateness of Congressional preemption of historic and 
comprehensive state regulation; third, it develops an argument against 
national product liability reform based upon this model; fourth and 
finally, it contends that the differences in mobility patterns between indi-
viduals and businesses reinforce these conclusions. 
II. THE NORMS OF FEDERALISM 
A political relic to some, 8 federalism nonetheless attracts works from 
a variety of academic fields. 9 These include both claims that federalism 
7. See, e.g., THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG 
GOVERNMENTS (1990) (favoring state over national public policy for most areas); Susan Bartlett 
Foote, Beyond the Politics of Federalism: An Alternative Model, I YALE J. oN REli. 217 (1984); 
C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93 (1983). 
8. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HAMILTON & DONALD T. WELLS, FEDERALISM, POWER, AND 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: A NEW THEORY OF FEDERALISM'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LIFE 3 (1990) 
(claiming that liberals and conservatives view "federalism as a cumbersome dinosaur, blocking 
policies they wish to see implemented."); PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS 
6 (1986) (labeling federalism a "buzzword"); Powell, supra note 6. 
9. These include, but are not limited to, economics, history, law and political science. See, 
e.g., DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (1966) (demonstrating 
positive political science perspective); William Graebner, Federalism in the Progressive Era: A 
Structural interpretation of Refonn, in GROWfH OF THE REGULATORY STATE, 1900-1917, at 102-26 
(Robert F. Himmelberg ed., 1994) (giving an historical account of state-federal tensions during 
progressive reforms); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE 
GROWfH OF NATIONAL POWER (1992) (describing evolution of and reasons for federalism 
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must recapture its constitutional stature, 10 as well as others that make no 
such assumption. 11 This paper takes the latter position. It acknowledges 
the former works and their importance and depends on many of their 
stated norms of federalism, but does not assume that federalism must re-
tain its legal substance to be worthy of review and analysis. Its only as-
sumption is that one or more of our great legal or political institutions 
must decide between the states and the federal government as the appro-
priate locus of control over historically state domains. The next subsec-
tion addresses the criteria influencing these "locus of control" decisions. 
A. Locus of Control Norms 
Normative federalism falls into two general categories: first, prescrip-
tions embracing or subordinating federalism compared to other govern-
mental forms (such as a unitary state12); and second, locus of control pre-
scriptions. Locus of control prescriptions concern the appropriate divi-
sion of powers and responsibilities between the central and local govern-
ments in a federal state. The norms most often cited favoring local and 
central control follow. 
Six major arguments supporting local control have been promulgated: 
1. Local units are more responsive to local tastes and conditions. 13 
2. Local regulation encourages a common market of states competing 
with one another for citizens through differential offerings of public 
goods.14 
movement toward more national power); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and 
Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995) 
(advocating legal work favoring re-legalization of federalism); Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation, the 
American Common Market and Public Choice, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 119 (1982) (favoring 
economic competition among states as preferable to federal preemption in most cases); Jacques 
LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power, 
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555 (1994) (justifying federal intervention into areas of commerce only 
where state regulation would be inefficient because of excessive externalities); Richard A. Posner, 
Toward An Economic Theory of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 41 (1982) (basic 
economic treatment of federalism). 
10. E.g., Calabresi and LeBoeuf, supra note 9. 
11. E.g., Foote and Gray, supra note 7. 
12. A unitary state or system has only one governing unit. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does 
Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J. PoL. EcoN. 152 (1981) 
(comparing unitary and federal state structures using social choice theory). 
13. Calabresi, supra note 9, at 775; Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems 
of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 
1196, 1210 (1977). 
14. Calabresi, supra note 9, at 775-76; LeBoeuf, supra note 9, at 559. Both authors cite 
the seminal work on point. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. 
PoL. EcoN. 416 (1956) (providing an economic analysis of the benefits of local over central 
governance). 
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3. Local governments are laboratories experimenting with the optimal 
provision of public goods and services. 15 
4. Local control encourages a greater awareness of the social costs of 
legislation. 16 
5. Decentralization diffuses power so that no coalition can easily 
acquire control over national affairs. 17 
6. Local governments, because they are smaller than the central govern-
ment, are more efficient regulators. 18 
Four arguments supporting central control oppose the above 
arguments in favor of local control: 
1. Centrally-made rules encourage economies of scale so that interstate 
and international markets are not encumbered by local regulations. 19 
2. Central regulation reduces the social costs of governance through 
standardization (i.e., currency). 20 
3. Central government intervention may control the problem of exter-
nalities arising from the states' unwillingness to internalize the social 
costs of their local rules. 21 
4. A central government must intervene when local governments are 
denying residents fundamental rights. 22 
Of course, these same norms might be used either to defend a federal 
over a unitary state or to prescribe central over local regulation. For ex-
ample, one may defend federalism based upon its tolerance for and pres-
ervation of local tastes and conditions. Decentralizing the authority to 
manage these local preferences might further both the premises of toler-
ance and preservation as well as the local control norm. However, if local 
tastes and conditions are both worthy of protection, perhaps because they 
15. See LeBoeuf, supra note 9, at 561-62 (citing local experimentation as a benefit of 
decentralization). 
16. Jd. at 563. 
17. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 9, at 6. 
18. DYE, supra note 7, at 106 (claiming that argument~ for national intervention are rarely 
based on more efficient governing). 
19. Calabresi, supra note 9, at 780. 
20. Jd. 
21. Externalities created by state regulations can be positive or negative. For example, 
rigorous clean water rules in an upstream state inure to the benefit of downstream states with less 
rigorous rules, thus creating positive externalities. If the upstream state has the less-than-rigorous 
rule.~, then this creates negative externalities for it~ downstream neighbors. See LeBoeuf, supra note 
9, at 570. 
22. The obvious example is civil rights. MARSHALL, supra note 3, at 2-4 (calling the civil 
right~ problem a "moral dilemma"). 
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represent fundamental rights, and in peril because of local government, 
then centralizing control may be an appropriate prescription. 
Three norms are mentioned most often in the debate concerning Con-
gress' nationalization of product liability law. State product liability laws 
further the local laboratory and competition-among-states norms because 
they embellish local regulatory or public policy schemes. However, these 
same liability laws can also pit states against each other. The laws also 
vary among the states, are quite complex, and arguably pose regulatory 
problems for manufacturers, insurers and other companies. 23 When these 
local laboratories adopt rules that disproportionately affect interstate 
firms, some will argue that these state rules create negative externalities 
which in turn encourage national intervention. 24 
1. A Competition-Among-States Model 
Thomas R. Dye champions both the competition-among-states and 
state-over-national-regulation models. 25 Dye's notion of "competitive fed-
eralism" envisions a "marketplace" for state governments "where 
consumer-taxpayers can voluntarily choose the public goods and services 
they prefer, at costs they wish to pay, by locating in the [state] that best 
fits their policy preference."26 Although he does not address directly 
product liability or state common law issues, Dye's conception of federal-
ism suggests that those affected by these state regimes will know and un-
derstand the variety of rules offered by the states, be sufficiently mobile 
to take advantage of those regimes that further their utilities (and avoid 
those that do not), and respond accordingly. According to Dye, state law, 
even in this complex regulatory environment, is preferable to national 
regulation. 
As applied to state product liability and other common law regimes, 
Dye's theory falls short. If his assertions are correct, then the principals 
in product liability litigation - manufacturers and other sellers, insurers 
and consumers - will make both location and operation decisions based 
upon their rational response to each state's regulatory environment. How-
ever, while it is true that we are among the most mobile societies in the 
23. See Victor R. Schwartz, Finally a Chance to Refonn Product liability Law, WALL ST. 
J.,. Sept. 9, 1992, at Al5 (lamenting the negative effects of state product liability laws on such 
businesses). 
24. See RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODIJCf LIABILITY MESS: How BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED 
FROM THE POLff!CS OF STATE COURTS (1988); LeBoeuf, supra note 9, at 584-85 (finding 
persuasive the argument that product liability rules may impose "substantial costs" on out-of-state 
entities). 
25. DYE, supra note 7. 
26. !d. at 14 (emphasis added). 
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world, 27 there is scant evidence that state public policies are important 
variables influencing interstate relocation by individuals. 28 Interstate 
movement is more closely tied to employment opportunities and local 
amenities.29 Additionally, making the assumption that individuals are 
knowledgeable, sensitive, or concerned about the arcane world of state 
common law rules defies both logic and the modest empirical evidence 
on point_3° 
Businesses, on the other hand, are knowledgeable about and sensitive 
to competing public policies, particularly state and local fiscal incentives 
which encourage relocation. 31 Businesses might also have the financial 
incentives and means to stay abreast of state regulatory regimes, includ-
ing state common law. Edmund Kitch states that businesses have both the 
incentive and ability to acquire information about state product liability 
regimes and to fold this information into their marketing and pricing deci-
sions.32 Kitch's theory suggests that Dye's model might be normatively 
suitable for firms that are in the business of operating within the 
standards established by state common law regimes, but appears to have 
little normative appeal when applied to individuals, whose immersion 
into the realm of product liability law represents an ex post facto re-
sponse to a failed transaction or other negative occurrence. Any theory of 
federal preemption of state product liability or other common law 
regimes must necessarily consider the relative differences between the 
relocation reasons of individuals versus those for businesses. 
2. A Negative Externality Response 
Judge Richard Neely harbors a decidedly different view from that of 
Dye. 33 Neely suggests that state product liability rules create significant 
27. Between 1990 and 1991, seventeen percent of U.S. citizens moved from one address 
to another. See Patricia Gober, Americans On the Move, POPULATION BULL. Nov. 1993, at 1. By 
international standards, this places the United States with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as 
one of the most mobile societies. Id. 
28. In fact, there is little research indicating a link between state public policy decisions, 
especially those generated by the common law, and citizen location. One study does link Canadian 
provincial location and provincial fiscal policies. See Kathleen M. Day, Interprovincial Migration 
and Local Public Goods, 25 CANADIAN J. ECON. 123 (1992). 
29. Gober, supra note 27, at 28-32 (linking interstate relocation primarily to jobs and quality 
of life amenities). 
30. See ROBERT EWCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 144-
45 (1991) ("Ordinary people know little of the private substantive law applicable to decisions in 
everyday life."). 
31. See David Cay Johnston, Boom Seen in State and Local Tax Aid to Business, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1995, at D4 (citing survey of companies, including comments that state and local 
tax incentives continued to be effective means of attracting businesses). 
32. Kitch, supra note 9, at 124-25. 
33. NEELY, supra note 24. 
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negative externalities because states are competing among themselves for 
the assets (in the form of damages) of out-of-state citizens.34 States use 
their product liability regimes as wealth creators at the expense of 
nonlocals. This "race to the bottom" mentality, is, in Neely's view, both a 
rational response by the states to their control over product liability law 
and a compelling reason for federal intervention. 35 If states could jointly 
enact meaningful reforms to combat this race to the bottom, then they 
might overcome the negative externalities wrought by their current re-
gimes. Jacques LeBoeuf, however, suggests that the transaction costs as-
sociated with such interstate cooperation are too high, thus eliminating a 
Coasian solution. 36 He also finds Neely's conclusions about product lia-
bility law to be persuasive, noting that a product liability system "gener-
ous to plaintiffs can result in the imposition of substantial costs on out-of-
state interests.'m 
As comprehensive solutions for product liability, Neely's and 
LeBoeuf's views, like Dye's, have their shortcomings. Their theories re-
mind us that identical criteria can yield virtually irreconcilable conclu-
sions, common in normative discussion and their arguments do not regard 
the numerous product liability reform efforts by the states as antithetical. 
The adoption by the states of damage limits, statutes of repose, and other 
reforms certainly does not square with Neely's "race to the bottom" and 
LeBoeuf's "insurmountable-transaction-costs" theses. 38 
What the opposing but ostensibly reasonable views of Dye, Kitch, 
Neely, LeBoeuf and others suggest is that the norms of federalism are 
instructive rather than dispositive, probabilistic rather than deterministic, 
and potentially emotive39 rather than rational. In sum, they are quite ame-
nable to a political debate in which the key issue of federalism - locus 
of control - becomes subsumed by underlying issues such as product 
liability law. Those who benefit or suffer from the nationalization of 
product liability or other state-dominated regimes will likely invoke the 
norms based on the goal of nationalization rather than a genuine fidelity 
to the federal system. They will do so notwithstanding over two hundred 
34. /d. at 57-79. 
35. /d. 
36. LeBoeuf, supra note 9, at 574 (citing insurmountable transaction costs as a major reason 
why the Coase Theorem does not solve the negative externality problem among states). 
37. /d. at 585. 
38. For a compilation of sum laws, see 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) '1!90, 110-195, 295 (1995) 
(compilation of state product liability Jaws, including reform measures). 
39. Emotivism suggests that "all evaluative judgments are nothing but expressions of 
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling." Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice 
Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1318 (1982) (distinguishing emotivism from factual 
judgment5 in constitutional theory). 
170 B. Y. U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 11 
years of national and state activity and as if every locus of control deci-
sion can be made de novo. 
An intellectually incomplete but useful method of reducing the pros-
pects of a de novo analysis is to recognize a presumption favoring state 
regulatory authority over historically state-dominated areas. The next 
subsection addresses this presumption. 
B. Presumptively State Domains 
Several commentators support a broad presumption favoring state 
over federal law. C. Boyden Gray, an official in the Reagan administra-
tion, advocated such a presumption and identified tour situations in 
which national action may be preferable to state action. These include 
situations in which state actions unduly burden interstate commerce, fed-
eral accommodations are necessary, the costs occasioned by interstate 
competition become too high, or the advantages of national expertise 
mandate federal action. 40 
Providing a thoughtful alternative, Susan Bartlett Foote first identi-
t1ed the shortcomings of Gray's prescriptions. These include the "absence 
of specific criteria" signalling the need for national action, despite the 
presumption favoring state law, and the "stark choice between state and 
federal control suggested by that framework."41 Foote claimed that the 
obvious product of these shortcomings is the continued politicization of 
federalism. 42 Foote's alternative offered five categories ("stages") -the 
product, production, the process of exchange, conditions of sales and ser-
vice, and conditions of use - providing "discrete" regulatory boundaries 
within which "the legitimate interests of both the states and the federal 
government" might be accommodated. "43 
Applying these authors' criteria to product liability appears to yield 
similar results. Addressing product liability directly, Gray contended that 
this is an appropriate area for federal preemption because state regimes 
are unduly burdening interstate commerce, and states have demonstrated 
no desire to adopt uniform reform measures. 44 Although not addressing 
product liability directly, Foote suggested such preemption, maintaining 
that nationally uniform standards are appropriate for product design and 
40. Gray, supra note 7, at 94. 
41. Foote, supra note 7. 
42. !d. (claiming that, "in the absence of specific criteria, politics, rather than guiding 
principles, often determines when the presumption [favoring state-level regulation] will be 
overcome." !d.). 
43. !d. at 219-21. 
44. Gray, supra note 7, at 98 ("(l]n this substantive area the federalist process of state 
experimentation and testing of alternative approaches has already had a full opportunity to develop 
the issues."). 
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performance. These national standards would apparently supplant state 
product liability regimes to the extent that state legislation, regulations, or 
interpretations, impose higher or lower product standards. 45 Otherwise, 
she claimed, states with more rigorous standards will impose costs on 
interstate firms which assume they must comply with these higher stan-
dards.46 
Both of these models are useful, but each is also incomplete and 
vague in its application. First, neither model is clear about the breadth of 
this presumption. It is probably inappropriate to presume in favor of state 
activity when such activity is nominal, nonexistent, or falls within an his-
torically federal domain. Second, embracing a presumption favoring state 
action merely defers the locus of control question unless the criteria for 
overcoming that presumption are rigorous and unambiguous. Because 
they either restate the traditional norms or add little to overcome the pre-
sumption, de novo and politicization problems raised in the previous sub-
section, Gray's criteria fail this test. Foote's model adds fairly observable 
criteria and more rigorous standards to the debate and is preferable to 
Gray's. However, like Gray, Foote largely ignores the level of state activ-
ity over which her federal preemptive standards might lay. One might 
differentiate, for example, between comprehensive, national environmen-
tal laws which preempt diverse, often infantile or nonexistent state 
regimes,47 from common law regimes such as tort and contract. These 
common law areas and their statutory embellishments fall uniquely 
within the realm of state regulation. 48 In fact, Congress, reluctant to pre-
empt these well-developed common law rules, has often included "saving 
clauses" intended to insulate the cmnmon law from nationallegislation. 49 
Foote's application of her model to chemical labeling cases 5° 
suggests an additional problem with her locus of control criteria. She pos-
45. Foote, supra note 7, at 219-20. 
46. /d. 
47. See LIEBER, supra note 2, at 191-94 (describing the application of the 1972 Clean Water 
Act amendments as uneven because of the "disunited" efforts made by the states in dealing with 
clean water issues); Hays, supra note 2 (claiming that environmental values and regulations varied 
measurably among states and regions). 
48. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (placing the common law squarely and 
uniquely within the province of the state courts). 
49. A saving clause in a federal statute "saves" state common law from "the annihilation 
which would result from an unrestricted repeal" [or preemption]. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1510 
(4th ed. 1968). An example of a saving clause appears in 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988) (repealed) 
("Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not 
exempt any person from any liability under common law.") 
An example of a saving clause, applied to citizens' actions against polluters, appears 
in 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1988): "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person 
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any 
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief . . . ." Id. 
50. See Foote, supra note 7, at 221-24 (applying her model to chemical labeling regulation). 
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its that federal law should govern product design and performance but 
that states should retain at least some regulatory powers over production 
and process of exchange issues, which include those involving informa-
tion flow. 51 Extending these criteria to chemical labeling, she asserts that 
OSHA labeling standards should preempt state regulation because "state 
labeling rules mandating that specific language be affixed to containers 
prior to shipping will increase manufacturers' costs. "52 Although Foote 
does not expressly state that such preemption should also preempt state 
common law duties to provide information, she implies exactly that, since 
labeling represents the single best method of conveying all relevant infor-
mation to the product's ultimate users. 53 
The problem here lies in distinguishing product design, performance, 
packaging and labeling from the plethora of information issues in product 
cases. For example, Ford Motor Company complied with federal rear im-
pact standards but possessed material information about their Pinto's 
ability to withstand such impact. 54 It is difficult to discern whether 
Foote's model would have preempted those state court decisions which 
held Ford accountable for this ethical lapse. 55 In general, product produc-
ers may comply with preemptive national design, performance, packaging 
or labeling standards, but they also may possess measurably more infor-
mation about product design, performance and potential problems than 
anyone else. If manufacturers possess information concerning product 
shortcomings that reasonable consumers need, but comply with federal 
standards, then whether such compliance preempts state courts from re-
viewing, ex post facto, a producer's product design and performance de-
cisions is unanswered by Foote's model. 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that a presumption favoring 
state over national action and Foote's more rigorous model for overcom-
ing such presumption offer direction but lack coherency and a moral un-
derpinning. Part III contends that contract adds an historically-based, sim-
ple, yet powerful analytic layer to these locus of control decisions. 
51. ld. at 220-21. 
52. !d. at 223. 
53. Foote maintains that her standards may allow state information requirements that do not 
affect the product's package, but does not include state common laws among these requirements. 
Although one might reasonably infer that common law rules would be included, one may also 
reason that imposing additional information requirements upon manufacturers, which use their 
packaging and labeling as primary information-conveying devices, imposes undue burdens on 
national markets. /d. at 221. 
54. See Dennis A. Gioia, Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A Script Analysis of Missed 
Opportunities, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 379 (1992) (recounting the company culture and decision-making 
that went into the decision not to spend $11.00 per car to upgrade the Pinto's ability to withstand 
a rear-end collision). 
55. E.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor. Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
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III. CONTRACT AND LOCUS OF CONTROL DECISIONS 
Still very much alive56 and despite its limits,57 contract provides 
philosophic and ethical direction when Congress or the courts must de-
cide between national preemption or continued state control of state com-
mon law domains. Rather than contradicting previous models, contract 
adds an additional and useful layer of reasoning to the calculus. Its cen-
tral theme is that the choices by rational, autonomous actors, cloaked 
with sufficient information58 and relatively equal bargaining power are 
worthy of legal protection. This theme has played an important role in the 
works of ethicists and legal commentators59 who have applied these ten-
ets to areas as diverse as corporate ethics60 and regulation of drug treat-
ments for HIV positive patients. 61 
Unlike these cases, contract norms applied to federalism emphasize 
contract's functional elements such as information and choice: conditions 
precedent for contract norms to apply. Rather than suggesting a contract-
type relationship or a social contract theory of federalism, I will offer a 
simple locus of control model that depends on whether the substantive or 
procedural rights created by a rule increase or decrease these functional 
elements of contract. I will also argue that contract has, historically, been 
an implicit but important factor in federal preemption decisions. 
56. See GRAN!' GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); see also Symposium. 
Reconsidering Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1995) (reviewing 
Gilmore's famous work). 
57. Su MICHAEL J. TREBU>COCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRALI' (1993); Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, The limiLY of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995) 
(both discussing the breadth and reach of contract, its limits and their reasons). 
58. I chose to use the adjective "sufficient," instead of the economic term "full" to measure 
the relevant information necessary to comply with the contract thesis. Sufficient information is just 
that: each party has sufficient information to make a voluntary exchange. This term, therefore, may 
represent a less ambitious requirement than full information. See generally ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 48, 235-36 (1988) (citing lack of information as a cause of 
market failure). 
59. See lAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas Donaldson, Contractarian 
Business Ethics: Current Status and Next Steps, 5 Bus. ETHICS Q. 173 (1995); Steven R. Salbu, 
Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: A Contractarian Model of Access, 11 YALE 
J. ON REG. 401 (1994). 
60. Dunfee & Donaldson, supra note 59 (applying contract ideas of rational consent to 
justify corporate existence, "principles, policies and structures"). 
61. Salbu, supra note 59 (applying a rational consent model to new and experimental HIV 
drug access). 
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A. Functional Elements of Contract 
Contracts in competitive markets are efficient, 62 assuming the actors · 
within that market are rational, that there are no or only modest negative 
extemalities,63 that these actors have full information concerning their 
choices and their consequences, 64 and that the parties are of equal or 
nearly equal bargaining power. 65 This ideal setting describes very few 
actual market environments, but is instructive both for economists who 
wish to compare empirically actual and idealized markets and for others 
who use the essential components of contract to critique actual or pro-
posed norms. Those who choose the latter strategy attempt to analyze ac-
tual or proposed relationships based on the presence of these contract 
components. Both they and economists will agree that actors prefer more 
information over less and that evenly distributed bargaining power dimin-
ishes the probability of market failure occasioned by coercion or similar 
problems.66 
Information and power are also important components of moral, so-
ciological, and political theories of contract. The assumption of informed 
and empowered actors is central to a stakeholder theory of corporate con-
duct, 67 constituting a "noncontractual" but cooperative understanding be-
tween manufacturers and suppliers,68 an informal, but accepted and en-
forced norm among ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California,69 
and a reinforcement through constitutional theory of minority representa-
tion.70 
62. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 58, at 230. 
63. Externalities, especially negative externalities, often play a significant role in contract 
and market failure because they impose costs on non-consenting third parties. ELLICKSON, supra 
note 30, at 58-77 (citing negative externalities as problematic in the exchange process); COOTER 
& ULEN, supra note 58, at 230. 
64. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 58, at 235-36 (citing "full" information as a 
prerequisite for an efficient contract). 
65. Trebilcock dedicates an entire chapter to the threat posed by coercion, including unequal 
bargaining power, to individual autonomy in contracts. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 57, at 78-101. 
66. Trebilcock cites the highwayman's admonition, "Your money or your life," as an 
example of a case in which a fully rational actor, cloaked with sufficient information, lacks the 
autonomy necessary to make a voluntary decision. This threat of physical violence creates an 
asymmetry in bargaining power and results in a breakdown of contract. /d. at 84-85. 
67. The seminal work on point is R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A 
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984) (in which the frrm's existence and obligations depend on its 
relationships with those affected by its decisions); Dunfee & Donaldson, supra note 59 (arguing 
that a firm's moral obligation depends on an implicit social contract with society). 
68. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 
28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) (citing extra-legal norms as more descriptive of long-term contract 
relations than formal contract rules). 
69. See ELLICKSON, supra note 30, at 177-78 (citing information obtained within informal, 
close knit groups as essential to the non-legal methods of resolving potential disputes as used by 
the ranchers and farmers in Shasta County, California). 
70. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (applying a theory of 
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Of course, both information and power distribution play particularly 
important roles in tort and product liability law. Information asymmetry 
often provokes duties to warn, create or expand product instructions, and 
provide sufficient, reliable information for potential investors. Congress, 
state legislatures, and courts have often placed on the possessors of rele-
vant market information the burden of providing that information to those 
for whom the costs and probability of discovery were respectively too 
high and too low. At common law, coercion in the form of fraud, duress, 
and undue influence provoked rescission rights for the victims. Statutory 
theories such as unconscionability11 represented public policy responses 
to power asymmetries. 
The common element among these legislative, judicial and moral re-
sponses is the allegiance to contract theory and its functional elements. 
For example, leveling the information and power fields for contracting 
parties is no panacea but usually leads to lower transaction costs,72 better 
commercial and consumer choices, and a more stable commercial envi-
ronment. These are all worthy goals, but, by themselves, provide no an-
swer to the locus of control question. The next subsection addresses this 
issue. 
B. Contract Elements and Locus of Control 
An appropriate next step in determining whether a compelling case 
for federal preemption exists is to ask whether the existing or proposed 
federal law enhances contract by providing its beneficiaries with neces-
sary information or power. Unlike previous models which furnish ammu-
nition to both sides of the federalism argument, a contracting model pos-
its that the only compelling cases amenable to federal intervention or pre-
emption are those in which federal action furthers contract by eliminating 
or reducing information and/or power asymmetries. If it does, then fed-
eral preemption mighF3 be an appropriate response. If it does not, then 
preemption is simply not appropriate, and the deciding institution- be it 
Congress or the courts - should defer such regulation to the states. 
constitutional interpretation based upon the expansion of citizens' ability to participate in their 
government). 
71. u.c.c. § 2-302 (1977). 
72. Transaction costs arise from the formation, performance and enforcement of contracts. 
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 58, at 236. One might argue that leveling information and power 
availability might cost more; however, in the long run such leveling will tend to reduce the costs 
associated with obtaining information or acquiring contracting power from other sources. 
73. This paper does not prescribe national intervention in such cases. In fact, the federal 
government might view the states as appropriate contract-enhancing governments. See infra text 
accompanying notes 91-98. 
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It should be note-d that using contract in this manner is not novel; con-
tract or contract-like reasoning has been the explicit or implicit justifica-
tion for most significant federal preemptive legislation passed since the 
beginning of the Progressive Era.74 Anti-trust and pure food and drug 
laws during the Progressive Era addressed both information and power 
asymmetries. These laws delimited the monopolistic power of holding 
companies,75 and mandated safer products and more accessible informa-
tion.76 Labor legislation during the thirties and forties, responding to 
power asymmetries between management and workers, had a decidedly 
contract underpinning. Such early twentieth century reforms were the 
result of a conscious decision by labor leaders to embrace freedom of 
contract as the "gospel" of the labor movement.77 National securities laws 
sought both to deliver relevant information to investors and to control 
those cases where insiders and others may appropriate this information at 
the expense of other investors.78 Civil rights laws preempted contrary, 
discriminatory state laws which not only deprived their own citizens of 
important political power but also imposed discriminatory laws on the 
citizens of other states who happened to be within their borders.79 Pro-
duct liability certainly cannot claim the moral imperative of civil rights 
nor can its preemption compare with the sweeping changes created by 
national labor, anti-trust, or even securities laws. It does, however, com-
pare favorably to two recent national incursions into historically state 
domains such as the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (FCCP A)80 
and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 81 Both of these statutes pre-
empted presumptively state domains, 82 but with contract-enhancing rules. 
74. The Progressive Era includes roughly the last two decades of the nineteenth and the first 
two decades of the twentieth century. During this time, reformers were instrumental in convincing 
both states and the national government to adopt many of their proposed reforms, including pure 
food and drug laws. antitrust legislation, and worker compensation laws. See WooD, supra note 
1; Graebner, supra note 9. 
75. C.F. Taeush attributes Congressional passage of the Sherman Act to a fear of "a new 
power on the social horizon: Business." Business and the Shemum Act, in ANTITRUST AND 
REGULATION 52 (Giles H. Burgess., Jr. ed., 1992). Taeush labeled corporations "a new kind of 
social energy, comparable in size and strength and value with state and church." !d. 
76. See WOOD, supra note 1, at 143-46 (citing proper labeling as central part of Pure Food 
Act). 
77. See WII.lJAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 
128-166 (1991)(asserting that labor's adoption of a contract theme displaced more radical and less 
tolerated themes). 
78. See Federal Bar Association, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-
1982, at 20 (1983) (citing full publicity and information as essential elements of the 1933 law). 
79. See MARSHALL, supra note 3, at 2 (commenting on President Kennedy's commitment 
to address this "moral dilemma" through preemptive legislation). 
80. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1601-1691(f) (1994). 
81. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
2301 (1994). 
82. Prior to the FCCPA, virtually all consumer credit transactions were governed by state 
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The FCCP A cloaked consumers with the right to credit information in 
consumer transactions,83 equal credit opportunities, 84 garnishment protec-
tion laws,85 and a limited right of rescission in residential home mortgage 
cases. 86 Although the preponderance of the FCCPA' s provisions are 
aimed at disclosure of credit terms to consumers, the equal credit oppor-
tunity, garnishment, and rescission rules attempt to correct the power 
asymmetries which often exist in consumer credit transactions. 
Magnuson-Moss was aimed primarily at product suppliers who make 
written warranties to their customers. The law requires such suppliers to 
label their warranties as "full" or "limited,"87 creates minimum standards 
for all written, product warranties directed at consumers, 88 and applies 
disclosure rules to product service warranties. 89 It also prohibits providers 
of written warranties from disclaiming implied warranty liability. 90 
The areas preempted by these two laws were extensively regulated by 
the states and were therefore presumptively state domains. However, be-
cause both of these national rules responded to potential market failures 
and were contract-enhancing, they were appropriate actions. By enhanc-
ing contractual elements, they overcame the presumption favoring state 
action. 
Rather than indicting current state regimes or subjecting them to 
comprehensive federal preemption, the application of a contract-enhanc-
ing norm to locus of control issues represents both a reasoned extrapola-
tion of one hundred years of federal activity and a knowable and usable 
moral underpinning for invoking federal action. This model allows states 
to retain virtually unfettered discretion over their common law regimes 
and leaves untouched those tields for which state activity has been un-
even, modest, or nonexistent. 91 The model, however, does allow federal 
intervention in those cases implicating both the traditional norms of fed-
eralism and these contract-enhancing norms. It is important to restate that 
common and statutory law. For the regulatory environment that preceded the FCCPA, see 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1984-2025 (reprinting H.R.Rep. No. 90-1040 (1967)). Likewise, the Magnuson-
Moss Act partially preempted state common law and the Uniform Commercial Code. See 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7706 (reprinting H.R.Rep. No. 93-1107 (1974)). 
83. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1604, 1637-38 (1994). 
84. !d. §§ 1691-1691(1). 
85. !d. §§ 1671-74. 
86. !d. § 1635. 
87. !d. §§ 2302-03. 
88. 15 u.s.c. § 2304 (1994). 
89. !d. § 2306. 
90. !d. § 2308. 
91. Historic examples might be civil rights or environmental regulation. See LIEBER, supra 
note 2, at 72 (identifying diverse levels of environmental regulation by the states prior to the 1972 
amendments); CIVIL RIGHTS Acr, supra note 3, at 7 (twenty-five states had laws similar to the 
Civil Rights Act at the time of il~ passage). 
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this model does not prescribe federal intervention in such cases. States 
are eminently capable of managing and correcting their common law re-
gimes through legislation or judicial decisions. Rather, contract is a use-
ful "acid test" to determine whether federal action is an appropriate alter-
native to state action in these presumptively state domains. To restate yet 
another important point: neither Congress nor the courts should encroach 
on these domains unless such action fosters both locus of control and 
contract norms. 
The following matrix models the operation of these norms. 
Enhances Contract Does Not Enhance 
Contract 
State Action i. X ii. X 
Federal Action iii. X iv. 0 
The "X"s in cells i - iii identify appropriate state or federal actions, 
while the 0 in cell iv. indicates the one case where federal action is inap-
propriate. The following subsections develop each cell's contents more 
fully. 
1. State Adoption of Contract-Enhancing Rules. 
In cell i, a state has adopted a contract-enhancing rule, i.e. a rule that 
attempts to correct or improve situations involving information and/or 
power asymmetries. Examples include state consumer laws, such as the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, which contain rules similar to those in 
the FCCPA,92 and rules governing unconscionability. 93 These are 
certainly appropriate actions within presumptively state domains. They 
further both contract and federalism. 
2. State Adoption of Rules Which Do Not Enhance Contract. 
Examples of state rules that do not enhance contract include those 
that limit a product liability plaintiff's ability to acquire relevant, propri-
etary information possessed by the defendant, place ceilings on damages 
in such cases, or create repose periods for product liability actions. Such 
92. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 6-510 (West 1983). 
93. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). 
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rules may or may not be good policy, but because they do not make infor-
mation more accessible nor level the power of the parties involved, they 
are not contract-enhancing. Although they further federalism, but not 
contract, these rules are appropriate state actions in presumptively state 
domains. 
3. Federal Adoption of Contract-Enhancing Rules. 
In cell iii, federal judicial or legislative action culminates in a 
contract-enhancing rule. As previously stated, the national government 
has significantly encroached into the presumptively state domain of 
contract-enhancing norms. If, over time, state rules like those in cell ii 
create information or power asymmetries, then Congress might require 
those who have relevant and usable information to provide it to those 
who do not or may provide political or commercial power to those need-
ing additional powers to make rational choices. These federal preemptive 
actions further contract, square with historic national incursions, and 
therefore protect federalism. 
Detractors may claim that if contract-enhancing norms must precede 
national preemption of presumptively state domains, then contract, like a 
gas, will expand to fill this analytic volume. Thus, anyone may arguably 
find a contract rationale for action. Although I believe such claims are 
tenuous, I suggest that those wishing to make these contract-enhancing 
assertions be given a forum in which to do so and that if the weight of 
public, legislative or judicial opinion supports their argument, then per-
haps such arguments merit consideration under the auspices of public 
policy. 
4. Federal Adoption of a Rule Which Does Not Enhance Contract. 
Examples of inappropriate actual or proposed federal actions falling 
within cell iv include recent product liability reform efforts by Congress, 
assertions by some manufacturers that federal product safety standards 
should preempt state common law theories ofrecovery94, and Congress' 
decision not to include a saving clause in its Cigarette Packaging and La-
beling legislation.95 The first presents a case of possibly appropriate re-
94. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, 
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALEJ. REG. 65, 100 (1989) 
(supporting manufacturers desire for a regulatory compliance defense). 
95. In fact, such legislastion has strong preemptive language. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334 
(1988): 
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the 
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forms violating presumptively state domains. Statutes of repose, more 
rigorous requirements for prima facie cases, expanded defenses, and lim-
its on damages may or may not be appropriate responses to current state 
product liability regimes; however, these rules neither pass the contract-
enhancing test nor possess any other ethical or moral underpinning pro-
voking national involvement. Therefore, advocates of such changes 
should confine their quest to state legislatures. 
Similarly, attempts by product liability defendants to avoid state 
product liability recovery theories can have precarious moral founda-
tions, as when defendants attempt to avoid liability by demonstrating 
compliance with federal safety standards which include a saving clause. 
In a recent example,96 Ford Motor Company claimed that federal motor 
vehicle safety standards preempted New Hampshire common law to the 
extent that such law might conclude that the absence of an air bag creates 
a defectively designed car. The New Hampshire Supreme Court justified 
its denial of federal preemption in this case because of the saving 
clause.97 Although Ford's theory furthered neither federalism nor con-
tract, both the New Hampshire Supreme Court and Congress furthered 
both, recognizing the importance of preserving historically, state-domi-
nated domains. While most would agree that federal motor vehicle safety 
standards represent appropriate Congressional activity, it would be a 
grave violation of a presumptively state domain to attribute preemptive 
force to these standards. They further neither contract nor federalism. 
Those who wish to challenge state court decisions like this one must nec-
essarily confine their arguments to the states. 
As with cigarette labeling, Congress' failure to include a saving 
clause has wrought inappropriate national incursions into presumptively 
state domains. The preemptive force of the national labeling law has 
eliminated potential state common law theories, including the duty to 
wam,98 in cigarette cases. Like the Pinto cases discussed earlier? many 
of the cigarette cases revolve around the manufacturers having relevant 
and important information that actual or potential smokers need to make 
!d. 
statement required by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any 
cigarette package. 
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall 
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any 
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions 
of this chapter. 
96. Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 665 A.2d 345 (N.H. 1995). 
97. !d. at 347. 
98. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992). 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. 
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rational choices. 100 Whether the common law should develop duties to 
provide such information is an important question, one better left to the 
states. In any case, it is difficult to fathom what, other than politics, moti-
vated Congress not to protect the common law from the labeling law. 
Such a decision furthered neither federalism nor contract. 
C. Competition Among States and Mobility Revisited 
One might argue that by yielding to state law in all but contract-
enhancing cases, this contract-based model unfairly places the burden on 
product producers and sellers because the resulting beneficiaries of infor-
mation and power asymmetry reforms tend to be consumers. While 
contract-enhancing norms might encourage national correction of these 
asymmetries, changes in rules that do not further contract are, according 
to the model, relegated to the states. The net effect is that product produc-
ers and sellers will be arguing their cases for reform before state, not na-
tional forums. 
This is an appropriate outcome which is consistent with Dye's asser-
tions about the benefits and costs of competition among states; that is, we 
can fold state public policy decisions into our utility analyses and make 
relocation decisions based upon these analyses. 101 In Part II, however, I 
suggested that this type of analysis is more consistent with the location 
decisions of businesses than those of individuals. 102 Seeking uniformity 
through federally preemptive legislation certainly furthers the strategic 
goals of producers and insurers but, according to Edmund Kitch, also 
"portrays a short-term perspective of management" and trades "short-run 
simplicity of uniform standards" for "the natural protection afforded by 
competition."103 Addressing product liability law, Kitch argues that states 
should retain control over this regulatory area but that voters within a 
state be apprised and pay the costs of that state's rigorous product liabil-
ity rules. 104 A federal law that "permits manufacturers to sell their prod-
ucts in states at prices which can take into account their differential lia-
bility exposure" might preserve state product liability regimes. 105 
100. What the tobacco companies knew but did not share with others appears to be grist for 
many of our leading publications. Philip J. Hilts & Glenn Collins, Records Show Philip Morris 
Studied Influence of Nicotine, N.Y. nMES, June 8, 1995, at AI; Jon Weiner, The Cigarette Papers. 
THE NATION, Jan. I, 1996, at II; Dan Zegart, Buried Evidence: The Damaging Secret Documents 
and Testimony Tobacco Companies Tried to Suppress, THE NATION, March 4, 1996, at II. 
101. DYE, supra note 7, at 14. 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32. 
103. Kitch, supra note 9, at 124. 
104. /d. 
105. Kitch, supra note 9, at 125. 
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Lawmakers would be incorrect to assume that the Kitch's assertion 
regarding businesses describes individual behavior. Individuals may be 
somewhat conscious of their public policy environments; however, they 
likely know little about disparate state common law regimes. More im-
portantly, a locus of control model applied to these regimes should not 
include as an important component an assumption or requirement that 
individuals are or should be aware of this esoteric body of law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is undeniably difficult to separate the underlying reasons for product 
liability or any reform from the issue oflocus of control. Too often, how-
ever, these reasons have subsumed federalism, rendering the institution a 
political relic. Traditional norms, including those favoring presumptively 
state domains, furnish little direction in these cases; rather they tend to 
encourage both the politicization and subsumption of federalism. Con-
tract provides a defensible and historical basis for deciding these locus of 
control questions. Its underpinning, that federal preemption decisions be 
based on contract-enhancing norms, provides a useful, additional analytic 
tool to locus of control cases. A contract-enhancing norm allows Con-
gress or the courts to preempt state domain only in those cases in which 
such preemption can effectively level the information or power 
assymetries arising under current state laws. In all other cases, states 
should retain full regulatory control over such domains. 
